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Abstract
This paper presents the stylized facts of open source software
innovation and provides empirical evidence on the impact of increased
competition by OSS on the innovative activity in the software
industry. Furthermore, we introduce a simple formal model that
captures the innovation impact of OSS entry by examining a change
in market structure from monopoly to duopoly under the assumption
that software producers compete in technology rather than price
or quantities. The paper identi¯es a pro-innovative e®ect of OSS
competition.
Keywords: open source software, innovation, strategic interaction.
¤Free University Berlin, Germany.
yAarhus School of Business, Denmark.
The Authors thank Roger Sherman and Zhentang Zhang for valuable comments. Previ-
ous versions of this paper have been presented at the International Industrial Organization
Conference (IIOC) at Northwestern University, Chicago, the Annual Meeting of the Cana-
dian Economic Association (CEA), Toronto and the annual conference of the European
Association for Research in Industrial Economics (EARIE) at Humboldt University, Berlin.
The usual disclaimer applies.
11 Introduction
Open Source Software (OSS) has increased competition in the software in-
dustry, as famously and involuntarily acknowledged by a major incumbent
software ¯rm:
\OSS poses a direct, short-term revenue and platform threat to
Microsoft, .... OSS has bene¯ts that are not replicable with our
current licensing model and therefore present a long term devel-
oper mindshare threat .... Recent case studies provide very dra-
matic evidence that commercial quality can be achieved/exceeded
by OSS projects."
(Vinod Valloppillil, Microsoft Software Engineer
quoted in: Halloween Documents, 1998).1
Major OSS projects have, captured signi¯cant market shares from their
proprietary competitors { commercial software producers. Linux, for exam-
ple, accounts for a 38% share of the server operating system market (Bitzer
2004) and is supported by major hardware ¯rms such as SUN, Compaq/HP,
IBM and Siemens. The OSS web server `Apache' captured a market share
of 68% by December 2004.2 Recently, the open source web browser `Fire-
fox' has been able to snatch a 5% market share from Microsoft's Internet
Explorer over the six-month period from May 2004 to October 2004 (Festa
2004). Most importantly, none of these products have ever been sold in a
retail shop.3 Furthermore there are literally millions of people involved in
programming and improving OSS and the huge majority of them have never
received any form of monetary reward for their e®orts.
In this paper we examine the entry of this unusual production method into
the software industry and its impact on innovation activity in the sector. In
particular, the emergence of OSS as competing products in formerly highly
1The origins of the Halloween documents are somewhat foggy. Allegedly, the docu-
ments are an internal Microsoft memo that was leaked to the prominent OSS advocate
Eric Raymond. After an initial dispute about these documents, Microsoft eventually ac-
knowledged their authenticity but dismissed them as low-level engineering studies. More
background information on these documents can be found on the Open Source Initiative
home page [http://opensource.mirrors.ilisys.com.au/halloween/].
2Cf. information on [http://news.netcraft.com/archives/web server survey.html].
3Yet, services surrounding OSS products may be sold commercially. To be more precise
{ and as will be elaborated in Section 2 below { OSS distributors may charge such fees
for their services as copy fees, maintenance, and individualizations of software, but not for
the OSS it self. Accordingly, any individual equipped with su±cient computer skills can
download, install, and operate any OSS product free of charge.
2concentrated software markets (extra-OSS competition) and the constant
threat of forking and branching of OSS projects (intra-OSS competition) has
raised fears of a potential anti-innovative e®ect.4 These concerns about a po-
tentially anti-innovative e®ect of OSS focuses on two main issues. First, the
emergence of a no-cost competitor on the software market raised the ques-
tion of whether commercial enterprizes will be able to compete successfully
or if they will eventually be displaced (Casadesus-Masanell and Ghemawat
2003, Bitzer 2004). In either case, decreasing pro¯ts of commercial software
producers will lower their ability to invest in R&D activity, thus resulting
in slower technological progress in the software industry. Second, an anti-
innovative e®ect of OSS may result if its development process is less e±cient
than that of commercially organised software:
\The OSS development model leads to a strong possibility of un-
healthy `forking' of a code base, resulting in the development of
multiple incompatible versions of programs, weakened interoper-
ability, product instability ..."
(Craig Mundie, Microsoft Senior Vice President,
talk given at New York University Stern School
of Business, cited after Microsoft 2001).
Both arguments imply that the emergence and success of OSS leads to
diminished technological progress in the software industry overall. While
the ¯rst argument implies a reduction in commercial enterprises' innovation
activity, the second suggests a waste of resources in OSS production per
se, for example due to reductions in scale. Both arguments are founded on
the belief that increased competition in knowledge-intensive industries { like
the software business { might harm innovation activity. The present paper
examines this issue in detail. First, we present background information on the
OSS development process and the pro- and anti-innovative forces inherent in
this development model. Second, we compile and review empirical evidence
on the success and speed of innovation in software market segments where the
entry of OSS has created new competitive situations, with both commercial
and other OSS producers. From this review, we conclude that there is no
evidence of an anti-innovative impact. On the contrary, it appears that the
entry of OSS into commercial segments of the market and the forking that
is occurring in some ongoing OSS projects are associated with increased
4The terms forking and branching refer to the risk that groups of OSS programmers
may splinter o® an existing project and develop the project in their own direction, thus
ultimately competing for the same user groups and customer base. By permitting this
possibility, OSS contains the potential for competition in its basic structures.
3innovation. Third, in a formal model we examine the impact of increased
competition on innovation activity; i.e. a change in market structure from
monopoly to duopoly in the software industry. The model also shows a pro-
innovative e®ect of OSS competition.
In the formal model we propose a general objective function based on
the dissemination of a software product and its technological level, where
the ¯rm-speci¯c technological level is driven by innovation activity.5 The
paper acknowledges { and explicitly models { that in such setting the de-
mand for software, i.e. its dissemination, is a matter of neither price nor
available quantity, but rather of the technological content (level) that the
software o®ers to users. Thus, technology is the strategic variable of software
competition. From the model, we derive the following results: First, the
transition from a monopoly to a duopoly (increased competition) increases
the technological levels chosen by the enterprises. Second, these ¯ndings ap-
ply both to pure OSS markets (intra-OSS competition) as well as to mixed
markets (e.g. entry of an OSS ¯rm into the market of a for-pro¯t monopolist;
extra-OSS competition). Third, assuming that development and innovation
costs of OSS ¯rms are lower than those of for-pro¯t ¯rms, then pure OSS
duopolies will produce more advanced technologies and thus higher rates of
innovation.
There exists a growing literature on OSS, see Rossi (2006) for a compre-
hensive literature survey. The history of OSS is documented, in for example,
Stallmann (1999), Rosenberg (2000), Torvalds and Diamond (2001), Feller
and Fitzgerald (2002) and Hars and Ou (2002). The existing literature high-
lights a variety of motives for OSS programmers to participate and innovate
{ ranging from the need for a particular software solution (user-developers)
to intrinsic motives such as fun and play { and emphasizes the importance
of community structures and product structures (e.g. modularity) for the
success of OSS: see for example Kuan (2001), Franke and von Hippel (2003),
von Krogh, Spaeth and Lakhani (2003), Shah (2003), Baldwin and Clark
(2003), Narduzzo and Rossi (2004), Ulh¿i (2004) and O'Mahony and Fer-
raro (2004). Other approaches to the OSS issue are, for example, Lerner and
Tirol (2002), who emphasize the role of signaling programming skills; Musto-
nen (2003), who presents a model of OSS licensing schemes and their e®ects
on programmer labour markets; Bitzer (2004) and Casadesus-Masanell and
Ghemawat (2003), who deal with the competitive impact of challenging a
commercial software ¯rm with an OSS alternative in theoretical terms; and
5Our paper di®ers from the industrial organization literature in its assessment of the
in°uence of competition on innovation activity { as initially raised by Schumpeter (1934,
1942) and Arrow (1962). Our paper treats strategic decisions on non-drastic product
innovation as driven, inter alia, by exogenous technological advancements.
4Johnson (2001) and Bitzer and SchrÄ oder (2005), Bitzer et al. (2004), who
model OSS development as a private provision of a public good situation.
Yet, while there is this substantial and growing economics and business
literature on the organizational, motivational, and product-structural fea-
tures of OSS development, the impact of intra- and extra-OSS competition
on innovation has not yet been examined. There are, however, several pa-
pers discussing the innovation process in OSS itself, which thus relate to the
present work. Narduzzo and Rossi (2004) examine the role that modular
product architecture has as a device for facilitating rapid and constant inno-
vation in OSS and highlight how OSS projects utilize these features. Ulh¿i
(2004) compares open source innovation (going beyond the realm of software)
versus the proprietary knowledge model of innovation, and emphasizes the
challenge that OSS innovation poses to traditional economic theories of in-
novation. Finally, the role of user-developers in innovative activity has been
emphasized by several authors, see e.g. Kuan (2001) or Franke and von Hip-
pel (2003), and has also been identi¯ed outside the production of software
(Franke and Shah 2003).
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The following section
provides an introduction to OSS pro- and anti-innovative features. In Section
3, we collect and discuss available empirical evidence on innovative activity
in the software industry since the arrival of OSS. Section 4 presents a simple
formal model of software competition and derives results on the impact on
innovation from increased competition. Section 5 concludes.
2 Open Source Innovation
Three frequently posed questions concerning OSS are. How does OSS devel-
opment work? Who is willing to programm OSS and why? And how are the
internal structures of OSS projects organized? In the following, we brie°y
summarize the answers put forward in the literature so far.6 OSS software
is programmed by volunteers who do voluntarily engage in a project and as
a rule do not receive any pay for their e®orts. While these programmers
are only loosely associated in community structures, `tacit' knowledge of
the project is passed on as explicit knowledge through project websites, and
more importantly, it is embedded in the source code of the software itself.
Individual OSS projects can attract substantial numbers of programmers.
One of the biggest OSS projects is Linux, with its estimated 10,000 active
developers. OSS employs a modular product architecture. Agents develop
6See Rossi (2006), for a survey of the literature, and our own Bitzer and SchrÄ oder
(2006), for a short introduction to OSS development.
5or improve the available OSS software by creating complementary software
modules, thus repeatedly contributing to the product (on the issue of modu-
lar versus integral product architecture, see Ulrich (1995)). The importance
of a modular product architecture in OSS has been emphasized by Baldwin
and Clark (2003) and Narduzzo and Rossi (2004). What is important about
modular architecture is that improvements (innovation) on one module do
not trigger the need for changes in other modules of the product. This facil-
itates incremental innovation. Most noticeable OSS is available for free and
ful¯lls the characteristics of a public good. In particular, the license terms {
which we will discuss below { make the crucial di®erence between open source
and commercial proprietary software, ensuring the non-exludability of OSS.
Furthermore, the °ow of information within and around OSS projects is ex-
tremely high and open to everyone. The Internet is the dominant tool facil-
itating this information °ow. This close-to-costless information is a crucial
characteristic of the open source development process. Information about
new and ongoing projects is compiled on websites and in news groups. Bugs,
bug ¯xes, module demands, etc., are listed and made available to program-
mers inside and outside the community. More importantly, there is a huge
informational content in source code itself. The source code both enables
other programmers to learn speci¯c programming steps, and gives them ac-
cess to understanding, criticizing and improving existing programming so-
lutions. Also, empirical studies show that the `average' OSS contributor is
young and well educated. Hars and Ou (2002), for example, ¯nd 54 percent
of the contributors in their sample to be less than 29 years of age and 72
percent have a college, masters or Ph.D. degree. Similar results are found
by Hertel et al. (2003), Lakhani and Wolf (2005), Krishnamuturthy (2002),
and Luthiger (2004). Finally, OSS programmers are often user programmers,
meaning that they engage in a project because they are not satis¯ed with the
existing software or simply because the required software feature does not
exist. For example, Linus Torvalds needed a Unix for his PC, resulting in
Linux (Torvalds and Diamond 2001), or Don Knuth needed a convenient tool
for type-setting documents resulting in `TEX'. Thus OSS programmers often
bene¯t directly from developing and improving the software in question.
Obviously, not one OSS project is identical to any other. Nevertheless,
we can identify some core agreements in the internal superstructure of
successful OSS projects. The literature ¯nds the following roles and
responsibilities for the involved agents.
6Roles and responsibilities in an OSS project
² Users: use the product of the project, report bugs, make feature
requests.
² Developers: write code, produce documentation. All developers who
contribute to a source ¯le may add their name to the list of contrib-
utors.
² Committers: make frequent and valuable contributions to the
project, earn voting rights when the project has to decide upon two
alternative routes. All committers are named in the project credits.
² Project Management Committee: consists of committers who fre-
quently make valuable contributions. Members of the project man-
agement committee are responsible for setting overall project direc-
tion.
Even though this presentation of roles and responsibilities hints at certain
hierarchical structures within OSS projects, this is not how it is perceived
within the communities. Community members view these structures as a nat-
ural extension of the division of labour. In particular, one does not achieve a
place at one of the levels of these structures ex o±cio, but by contributing to
the common OSS project. Important for the present issue of competition and
innovation is the project management committee level. It is a disagreements
at this level that can potentially lead to forking, and thus to intra-OSS com-
petition. Yet the unifying force in the OSS project, both counterbalancing
the threat of forking and generating the prime driver for individuals earning
status within a project, is an alleged single dimension of quality. The claim
within the community of programmers is that all developers and commit-
ters can and will be able to judge the quality of other programming work,
precisely because the source code is open. It is argued that it is always pos-
sible to derive a clear ranking of competing modules, and most importantly,
that there will typically be broad agreement in this ranking. Thus, in the
terminology of the paper, an improvement of an ongoing OSS project must
constitute an innovation step.
To see how these structures in the management of OSS projects inter-
act with innovation, consider the case of Linux (see e.g. Torvalds 1999).
Ever since Torvalds made the ¯rst Kernel freely available in 1991, Linux
has rapidly developed into a stable and widely-used operating system. Two
di®erent innovation patterns can be observed in the development of Linux:
on the one hand, the innovation pattern for the development of the kernel,
7the crucial part of the operating system; and on the other, the development
of other software closely connected to Linux such as hardware drivers or
graphical engines.
In the case of the development of the kernel, the worldwide developed
patches are collected and screened by a group of around six programmers
working with Torvalds (the project management committee in the above
terminology). As the kernel is crucial for the stability of the operating system,
the programmers propose speci¯c changes based on their tests. This selection
od changes is passed on to Torvalds for ¯nal approval. These approved and
stable running kernel versions are given an even version number.7 This part
of the innovation process therefore has a hierarchical pattern paired with
singular technically determined quality criteria.
The development of additional modules (e.g. hardware drivers) and small
applications, on the other hand, is more uncontrolled and undirected and
takes place in LINUX newsletters, user groups, mailing lists and Internet
pages. Projects in progress are presented on special information pages where
concrete opportunities for co-operation are presented.8 A selection of the
patches, modules and applications o®ered is made by the community through
prefered use of `better'9 versions. This part of the innovation process has a
somewhat more anarchic pattern and user-determined quality criteria.
The existence of the two di®erent innovation procedures within the de-
velopment process of Linux is the result of the modular construction of the
system. Although it seems likely that this was not foreseen by Torvalds at
the start, this setting turns out to have the signi¯cant advantage that it pro-
motes quick progress through the opportunity for independent development
and debugging of di®erent parts of Linux. In particular, the further devel-
opment of the kernel and di®erent modules can be carried out without any
formal coordination of the di®erent innovation activities.
2.1 The OSS licensing scheme
The cornerstone of the OSS movement is its ability to provide a coherent and
incentive-compatible licensing scheme. In the software industry, two domi-
7Kernels which are in the process of being developed, patch levels have uneven version
numbers. The current one is 2.7. These unstable so-called developer kernels are available
on the Internet. See for example [www.kernel.org]. The current stable version is 2.6.10
released in December 2004.
8See e.g. [www.linux.org], [www.themes.org] or [www.linuxhelp.org].
9`Better' depends here on the tastes of the user. It could mean the reliability of the
program as well as the innovativeness of the software or other characteristics of the software
program.
8nant licensing concepts can be distinguished: OSS and commercial software.
In addition, there are less-relevant licensing concepts such as public domain
software, freeware and shareware.
Commercial software is de¯ned as being software which, through certain
licensing conditions, prohibits or limits usage, modi¯cation and duplication.
Modi¯cation is often not an option as the source code is not available.
The possibilities for usage are limited, as the source code written by the
programmer is replaced by a compiled code. In contrast to commercial
software, the source code of OSS is freely available. The basic idea and
main aim of open source (or free software10 as it is sometimes called) is
free usage and the possibility for further development by the user. `Free',
in this context, means that the user is free to duplicate, modify, and
distribute OSS. The term open source software covers a number of vary-
ing forms of software licenses, which all seek to ensure free access for the user.
Key features of OSS licenses
² Free distribution: No licensing fees may be charged for the software.
² Source code available: The program must contain the source code or
at least indicate an alternative method of receiving it, i.e. via the
Internet.
² Derived works must be published as OSS: Any modi¯cation of the
program falls into the same licence as the original software.
One of the most popular OSS licences is the GNU-GPL which is a free
software and copyleft license written by the FSF in 1989.11 Linux, for ex-
ample, is subject to the GNU-GPL. The most important condition of the
GNU-GPL apart from the above features is the `No guarantee' feature. Un-
less agreed otherwise, there is no guarantee for the software. The risks in the
10The terms free software (introduced by the FSF) and open source software (introduced
in 1998 by a group of programmers on the open source meeting in Palo Alto, California)
are nearly interchangeable. Arguably, the term open source software holds the danger
that the aspect of the free software concept, namely the free distribution and modi¯cation
of the software, is not su±ciently emphasised. Therefore the concept of open source is
declined by the FSF. In this article both concepts are used synonymously.
11The exact wording of the GNU GPL can be found at [www.linux.de/linx/gnu.html] or
the pages of the Free Software Foundation at [www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.html]. In addition
to the GNU GPL there are many other OSS licences. Some of the more important are:
BSD License (original); BSD License (modi¯ed); GNU - Library General Public License
(LGPL); X11 License; Apache License; Mozilla Public License (MPL); Netscape Public
License (NPL); Qt Public License (QPL); Artistic License.
9level of quality and productivity are under the principle of caveat emptor.
Similarly to open source software, Public Domain software also makes
its code freely available. The author allows modi¯cations and duplications
without receiving any reimbursement, thereby giving up any copyright or in-
°uence on his work. Representatives of the Free Software Foundation (FSF)
and the Open Source Movement have spoken out against the concept of public
domain software, as a user can make changes to a program, turn it into com-
mercial software and thereby withhold it from the public. Thus the central
di®erence between public domain software and open source software is that
the latter is protected from withholding and absorption by commercial soft-
ware by certain licensing conditions. As in the case of public domain software
and OSS, freeware and shareware products can also be duplicated. Freeware
and shareware allow the user to duplicate and distribute the software, but
not to modify it. In this respect, the source code of freeware and shareware
is just as inaccessible as it is in the case of commercial software. In order
for potential buyers to investigate a piece of software, shareware products
have limited usage which is generally controlled by a ¯xed period of evalu-
ation or the amount of usage itself. Accordingly it is more of a marketing
concept than a licensing concept. Fees are charged if the shareware is copied
or distributed, which is a contrast to OSS, and to public domain software
and freeware, which can be obtained over the Internet free of charge. It is
important to note that with commercial software, companies generally make
most of their pro¯ts in licensing and duplications fees. Table 1 summarises


















































































































































































































































































112.2 Stylised characteristics of the innovation process
The organizational and motivational features and the ownership rights
and licensing conditions introduced above have an important in°uence on
the OSS development process. Abstracting from the details of single OSS
projects, there are a number of stylized characteristics of the OSS innovation
process valid for the majority of OSS projects. The innovation process
of OSS has several pro-innovative features compared with the innovation
procedures of commercial enterprises.
Pro-innovative features of OSS
² Army of programmers: huge number of programmers, open commu-
nities, support functions, collective problem awareness
² High knowledge spillovers: the source code contains both the prod-
uct and the information of how the product is constructed, huge
opportunities for learning and knowledge spillovers
² Motivation e®ect: high motivation of programmers, gift culture, in-
trinsic motivation, peer group monitoring
² Boundless cooperation: absence of commercial con°icts, open inno-
vation system, modular product architecture
² User-developer e®ect: User developers imply detailed knowledge of
what improvements are needed, innovation close to the customer.
² Disciplining forking-thread: constant risk of forking and branch-
ing of the project if it does not life up to community expecta-
tions/standards.
² Zero-costs e®ect: no R&D costs, no sunk costs, no research invest-
ments that must be recovered, willingness to abandon development
dead-ends.
The huge number of programmers is partly a result of the fact that the
source code is open and available for free. For example, universities often
use OSS products in their classes for programming training because of the
availability of the code. This of course adds a substantial amount of contribu-
tions to the development of the selected OSS projects. Furthermore, young
programmers get in touch with the OSS community (Dempsey et. al., 1999).
The key pro-innovative channel of engaging a huge number of programmers
12is simply that more programmers improve, bug-check and bug-¯x, and fur-
ther develop OSS products than in commercial enterprises. The operating
system Linux, for example, is estimated to be maintained and developed by
some 10,000 active programmers. In commercial enterprises the number of
software programmers is lower and they have to cater to a larger number of
software projects. Linux's competitor, Microsoft, for example, which o®ers
around 5,500 di®erent software solutions accompanying their well-known op-
erating system has a total of approximately 15,000 engaged in research &
development activity.12
An important di®erence from closed source software is the ability of OSS
to facilitate knowledge spillovers within the community. Given enough time,
a computer programmer can, from available source code, deduce, learn, and
improve the programming steps developed by other programmers. Thus pro-
grammers can read, understand, and learn from the programming innovations
of other programmers. Thus the knowledge di®usion within OSS projects is
maximized (cf. Raymond 2000b). Closed source software by its very nature
limits this ability to the group of actual project participants, who have ac-
cess to only parts of the ¯nal software product, depending on their rank and
position. Furthermore, displaying programming steps has a clear disciplining
e®ect on programmers, as it implies an audience. An audience, as in any job,
motivates a programmer to provide cleaner, more e±cient and more elegant
code, compared to a compiled piece of software, which disguises cumbersome
or faulty programming steps.
This leads to another striking feature of OSS production, namely the high
motivation of the contributing programmers. First of all by the very nature
of voluntarism, programmers usually only work on projects that they enjoy
working on. Another reason for high motivation is signaling as the result
of one's programming work being published, and the authors' name stated.
The providers of the OSS bene¯t in some ways from being able to signal their
programming skills; either through improving prospects on the job market,
Lerner and Tirol (2002) and Raymond (2000b), and/or enhancing reputations
within the community of programmers (see Raymond 2000a, and Torvalds
and Diamond 2001). Such signals are institutionalised in OSS activity: an
OSS license obliges its programmers/users to document all program changes
made (including naming the author of the changes) in the software itself.
Thus, each programmer is interested in maximizing the signal value of his
work by providing high quality software. Finally, the important side e®ect is
that peer group monitoring { mentioned above { also heightens motivation:
12See [www.microsoft.com/presspass/fastfacts.htm] and
[www.microsoft.com/Germany/] and SuSE, C't and Linux-Magazin.
13precisely because the source code is open, certain programming steps and
the quality and elegance of the programming work is visible to every other
programmer { as opposed to compiled software, where the design and quality
of the programming is not disclosed directly { and this acts as a motivational
driver to deliver better programming work.
Boundless cooperation is another important advantage of the OSS in-
novation process. Because commercial exploitation of the newly developed
software is not intended, there is no need to keep new ideas secret and there-
fore barriers against cooperation do not emerge. This results in two factors
making that make the OSS innovation process pro-innovative. First, and as
mentioned above, the unlimited access to the source code leads to a very
high knowledge di®usion. Second, as no commercial interests prevent the co-
operation between programmers, bene¯cial combinations of complementary
programming skills can be exploited. It is also noticeable that the voluntary
and innovative co-operation of developers allows for individual and speci¯c
solutions for software problems and programming queries to be found. A
similar spectrum of solutions provided by commercial software is unthink-
able because of the cost involved. Finally, under the heading of bound-
less cooperation, also the innovation advantages stemming from a modular
product architecture must be captured. Improvements (innovation) on one
module do not trigger change requirements in other modules of the product,
thus rapid innovation is facilitated (Baldwin and Clark, 2003; Narduzzo and
Rossi,2004).
The ¯fth important advantage, in particular in comparison to commercial
software development, is the close connection between users and developers.
Often user and developer are the same person as the need for a particular
solution is a driving motive to start an OSS project or to develop a certain
extension to an ongoing OSS. This user-developer element is taken to con-
stitute a major advantage of the OSS development process, see Kuan (2001),
Franke and von Hippel (2003).13 But even if the programmer and the user
are two di®erent people, the communication between them takes place very
directly because the contributor of OSS is published and can be addressed
directly. Thus, the communication is not hampered by sales and support
departments or other intermediaries. These close connections enable much
quicker problem-solving and removal of bugs in the software.
The pro-innovative impact of the forking-thread e®ect has not been dis-
cussed in the literature thus far. Forking and branching describes the split-
13In fact this phenomenon of user-developers is by no means restricted to the realm of
OSS, see for example Franke and Shah (2003) who analyze cases of user communities that
support innovation activities for sports-related products.
14ting up of OSS projects into rival and competing development streams. The
right to modify and distribute as OSS a splintered version of an existing
project puts every programmer in the position to leave the community and
set up a new project, further developing a derived version in an alternative
direction. This thread leads to a decision process quite di®erent from that
in commercial development procedures. The decision on the future develop-
ment is thus based on democratic principles, where the majority of the most
important contributors usually decide. This has two important e®ects on
the OSS innovation process. First, it ensures that technological aspects are
central to the decision in which direction the further development of an OSS
project should go. Second, new innovations are implemented immediately.14
Finally, the zero cost e®ect results from the fact that the development of
an OSS is not restricted by cost considerations. Thus, in the decision between
two technological alternatives, costs are not a decisive criterion. Therefore
technologically superior but not economically pro¯table software solutions
can be realised in an OSS environment. The same holds true in the case of
further development of software. As an update of software is connected to
development and release costs, commercial enterprises are tentative about
releasing minor software updates. OSS communities, on the other hand, act
following the principle of `release early, release often' (cf. Ramond 2000b,
Chapter 4). Thus, the disrespect for sunk costs makes OSS products more
prone to changes and improvements.
Beside these advantages in the innovation process of OSS, there are, of
course, also severe disadvantages in particular in comparison to commercial
development of software, several of which we have already mentioned. The
key problems can be summarized as follows.
14An example of a fork that emerged because a sub-group of programmers felt that
new contributions and patches has not been released quickly enough is `The Community
OpenORB Project' (cf. http://openorb.sourceforge.net/).
15Anti-innovative features of OSS
² Development redundance: redundant and abandoned developments,
double e®orts
² Undirected process: undirected development process, missing items
problem, incomplete innovation
² Unhealthy forking: splitting of the code base, incompatibility prob-
lems, fragmentation of network e®ects
² Supply side constraint: splitting the combined available supply of
programming skills across to many projects
² Code reuse problem: extensive code reuse, di±cult to track down
subsequent changes/improvements
Due to the freedom within the various OSS communities, there are a huge
number of redundant developments which often result in the `reinvention of
the wheel'. From an economic point of view, this is a waste of resources. Ar-
guably, it may be practical and feasible for OSS projects to search the space
of conceivable software solutions through the power of the size of the com-
munity (army of programmers), thus simply running an immense amount of
trial and error experiments. However, the economic and innovative e±ciency
of this approach is questionable. This leads directly to the next problem,
namely that of undirected development.
The problem of an undirected innovation process is problematic in partic-
ular for professional users. Development of particular software components
is not guaranteed by the respective OSS communities. For example, certain
drivers may not exist for Linux, and Linux users have no in°uence { apart
from suggesting the driver or getting it programmed for pay { on the decision
of programmers to develop the driver. Furthermore, because of the absence
of a liable coordinating institution, it can neither be guaranteed that existing
hardware or software is supported by the operating system in later versions
nor that newly purchased hard- or software will be supported. Of course due
to the openness of the source code, it is possible to order single-unit produc-
tion of the required software component, but this would cause extra costs,
and/or the resulting solution would have to be shared with the whole com-
munity through the publication of the source code. In contrast, commercial
software enterprises usually pay much attention to the backward and forward
compatibility of their software, as well as to the support of older and newly
emerging hardware.
16Next we come to the unhealthy forking issue mentioned in the quotation
presented in the introduction and the issue of potentially hitting a supply
side constraint. Once forking has occurred, it is accompanied by several
anti-innovative e®ects. First, the appearance of `forks' ultimately reduce the
number of programmers working on each of the forks, thus reducing the rate
of innovation via a supply-side e®ect. Second, forking could lead to incom-
patible standards reducing existing network e®ects. Overall, the potential
supply side restriction really is the °ip side of the army of programmers.
Finally, as discussed by, e.g., Spinellis and Szyperski (2004) the extensive
code reuse embedded in the production process of OSS may, to some extent,
create a barrier to innovation. Everything from a few lines of code to entire
program structures may be and are reused in OSS projects. This really
constitutes the °ip-side of the knowledge spillover e®ect discussed above.
The problem of code reuse, however, is that di®erent versions of the same
programming item may exist at the same time, and once reused in other
parts of the same or even another project, an improvement of the initial
part is close to impossible to trace onwards to all the subsequent places of
use. Furthermore, Spinellis and Szyperski (2004) also argue that due to code
reuse, shoddy and substandard code may be duplicated and spread, since the
monitoring practices and quality standards of di®erent OSS projects diverge
widely.
Thus, in concluding this section, it must be noted that from the above
considerations, one cannot judge if the OSS development process is more or
less e±cient than the commercial model. In order to answer the question
one needs to assess the costs of the OSS process, which, even though pro-
grammers are unpaid, undoubtedly exist in the form of time and e®ort spent
and opportunity costs in general. To be clear: we are uncertain whether the
commercial development process if given the same inputs { that is the same
army of programmers and degree of dedication and motivation { might not
result in more innovation. Arguably, commercial software production may
be unable to generate the same motivational drivers as OSS, but this is not
the same thing as saying the OSS is a more e±cient production method.
Nevertheless, what can be deduced from the above discussion is that the oc-
currence of competition caused by the entry of OSS (extra OSS competition)
or through forking (intra-OSS competition) will most likely have an impact
on individual and accumulated innovation activity in the software sector. It
is this e®ect that we attempt to shed light upon in the next section by pre-
senting empirical indicators of innovation activity in the software industry
following the entry of OSS.
173 Innovation impact of OSS: empirical indi-
cators
The impressive success of the OSS development model is best illustrated by
the rapid capture of market shares in traditional commercial software mar-
kets by OSS competitors. For example, in the lucrative server operating
systems market the market leaders of the mid-90s (Novell and Unix) have
lost market shares over the past 10 years, two entrants { one commercial (Mi-
crosoft with Windows NT) and one OSS (Linux) { now dominate the market
with approximately 40% market share each (see Bitzer, 2004). The same has
happened in the market for web servers (see Figure 1). Former market lead-
ers like the National Center for Supercomputing Applications (NCSA) and
Netscape (included in SUN in Figure 1) have lost their dominating market
position against the commercial entrant Microsoft and the OSS Apache.

















Although commercial software enterprises might lose market shares with
the entry of OSS, this is of course not evidence of either a pro- or anti-
innovative e®ect in this market segment. Not only is there competition from
OSS, but also from commercial software enterprises that have been able to
enter the software markets discussed successfully. What is needed for such
an analysis is data on the technological innovations introduced. Data on
technological progress in software technologies is, however, di±cult to com-
pile. We use here the following proxi. We regard the release history as a
possible indicator of technological progress in software technology. This is
18because the release of a new version creates costs, not only for the software
¯rm or OSS developer but also for the customers implementing it (switch-
ing costs). A customer is only willing to introduce a new software version
if the bene¯ts thereof are greater than the implementation costs. Thus, the
resulting release costs will only be justi¯ed if there is at least a certain tech-
nological improvement in newly released software.15 Furthermore, it can be
expected that the higher the release costs, the higher the technological im-
provement necessary to o®set investment. In particular, it seems that the
rate of commercial software and OSS innovation has increased with emerging
competition. The release history of Microsoft's Windows (see Table 2) shows
that the intervals between major releases have decreased continuously since
the beginning of the 1990s.









Source: Information published at: [www.microsoft.com].
Compare this to some key indicators of innovative activity at OSS com-
petitor Linux (Table 3).
15As was discussed under the zero cost e®ect in the previous section, the release cost of
OSS is of course only a fraction of that of a commercial software producer. Hence it is
important to not directly compare release frequencies across software producers but only
the changes in release frequencies of individual producers across time and in reaction to
entry and competition.
16Further minor releases have been Windows 3.1 and Windows for Workgroups 3.11 in
1993 and Windows 98 SE in 1999.
19Table 3: Development of Linux 1991-2004
Year Version Users Lines of code
1991 0.01 1 10,000
1991 0.10 100 18,000
1992 0.96 1,000 40,000
1993 0.99 20,000 80,000
1994 1.0 100,000 180,000
1995 1.2.0 500,000 310,000
1996 2.0.0 1,500,000 780,000
1997 2.0.2x 3,500,000 800,000
1998 2.0.3x 7,500,000 1,500,000
1999 2.2.0 12,000,000 1,800,000
2000 2.4.0 18,000,000 3,380,000
2002 2.5.37 23,400,000 5,100,000
2003 2.6.0 30,420,000 6,000,000
Source: McHugh (1998), information from SuSE, author's enquiries. E.g.
information on [http://www.win.tue.nl/ aeb/linux/lk/lk-1.html].
A similar trend of increased innovation activity is also found for compe-
tition among OSS projects, as documented in Figure 2. The case of the two
graphical OSS desktop environment competitors GNOME and KDE resem-
bles the features of an OSS fork. The data does not indicate any slowdown in
innovation subsequent to increased competition (the entry of KDE). On the
contrary, both branches appear to have gained momentum once competition
kicked in (see Figure 2).
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Source: www.kde.org , www.gnome.org.
20Quite the reverse can be observed in the case of decreasing competition,
e.g. in the case of the Microsoft Internet Explorer (see Table 4). In the early
years 1995-1998 when Microsoft was facing competition from Netscape's web
browser, the period between major releases decreased steadily. After 1998,
however, when Microsoft won the battle and dominated the web browser
market, the delay between major releases appears to have grown. The next
release, Internet Explorer 7.0, is expected for late 2005, about four years after
the last major release 6.0.17 Thus by this measure, a decrease in competition
(the exit of the Netscape browser) appears to be associated with a slowdown
in innovation.






















However, recently { and conceivably in reaction to this slowdown { a new
competitor has successfully entered the market: `Mozilla Firefox' a stand-
alone OSS web browser. Mozilla Firefox's version 1.0 released in November
2004 was downloaded 5.6 million times within the ¯rst two weeks.18 Further-
more, experts report that Microsoft's Internet Explorer has lost 5 percent
17The Internet Explorer 7.0 is planned to be released with Windows Longhorn the
successor of Windows XP.
18See information on [http://www.mozilla.org/news.html].
21of market share to Mozillas Firefox over a six-month period since May 2004
(see Festa 2004). Table 5 documents the impressive development e®orts of
the Mozilla Firefox programming community.























Remarks: * codename \phoenix"; ** codename \¯rebird"
Source: www.mozilla.org.
The above evidence on innovation activity following the entry an emer-
gence of OSS can only be a ¯rst attempt at answering the issue of the inno-
vation impact from intra- and extra-OSS competition. The data and cases
presented do not o®er evidence of an anti-innovative impact; on the con-
trary, if anything, the entry of OSS into commercial segments of the market
or forking in ongoing OSS projects appears to be associated with increased
innovation activity.
224 A model of Software Competition
4.1 Intra- and extra-OSS competition
Competition between a pro¯t oriented commercial software ¯rm and an OSS
developer community follows di®erent rules than the \standard" competi-
tion model. First, the incentives of the actors di®er. Second, the strategic
variables are neither price nor quantity, but rather technology.19 Third, the
behavior of the market participants is strongly in°uenced by an exogenous
technological factor.
First, the incentives of OSS developers have recieved a great deal of at-
tention. It is widely acknowledged that, while commercial ¯rms maximize
pro¯ts, OSS developers are interested in enhancing their reputation and/or
signalling value (e.g. Raymond, 2000a, 2000b; Torvalds and Diamond, 2001;
Lerner and Tirole, 2002). Hence, even though a pro¯t motive can be ruled
out for OSS developers, they nevertheless maximise these other payo®s. Al-
though the incentives of the two types of software producers are di®erent,
both incentives are positively correlated with the dissemination of their re-
spective software product. While commercial ¯rms are interested in increas-
ing their pro¯ts by bene¯tting from decreasing average costs with increasing
dissemination of their software, OSS developers bene¯t from the dissemina-
tion of their OSS in terms of enhanced reputation and signaling value (Lerner
and Tirole, 2002).20 Thus, commercial ¯rms and OSS developers can still be
assumed to maximise their respective payo®s, which depend in turn on the
dissemination of their software. To capture both types of software produc-
ers, we use a general objective function that can represent both commercial
software producers and OSS developers.
Second, the strategic variable in a software market is neither price nor
quantity. Software is an intangible good that can be duplicated at virtually
no cost, and in addition, at least one agent (the OSS developer) distributes
his product at zero price.21 Since there can be no talk of either quantity or
price competition, our paper starts out by formulating an (admittedly un-
19In particular, The emergence of no-cost competitors in the software market has altered
the type of competition. In such market segments neither price nor quantity are impor-
tant competition axes but technology became the crucial determinant (see Bresnahan and
Greenstein (1999).
20Furthermore, the presence of network e®ects in software use could explain why both
types of software producers value dissemination.
21In fact also the price of most commercial software is often inessential from a consumer's
point of view. The majority of software is sold as pre-installed, thus its ability, reliability,
compatibility, etc { in short its technological content { drives the consumer's decision,
while the price is a matter between the soft- and hardware producer.
23conventional) model in which software providers do not compete in price or
quantities, but instead in the technological content of their products. A high
level of technology ensures widespread dissemination of the software, which
is good for the producer, but also raises the costs of development and main-
tenance (bug ¯xing etc.). We apply a broad concept of technology including
all properties that in°uence the user's decision to employ a certain soft-
ware package. Depending on the type of software, the technology therefore
includes characteristics like supported hardware, ease of use/installation, in-
terconnectivity capabilities, range of features, state-of-the-art functions, per-
formance, quality, reliability, and so on. Thus, the technology of a software
includes the entire bundle of its technological characteristics.
These considerations lead us directly to the third di®erence between our
model and a \standard" competition setting. The \value" of a piece of soft-
ware to a user depends strongly on how up-to-date its general functionality is
or, to put it di®erently, its \real" technological level. The real technological
level depends on how far each technological characteristic of the software is
behind the state of the art: the \technological frontier" of that particular
aspect of the software. Thus, the technological level of any piece of soft-
ware is de¯ned in relation to the global technological level, which consists of
all the most advanced developments in each aspect of that software at the
current point in time.22 On the other hand, the global technological level
itself is constantly changing. It is set by the developments in the globally
available technology which in°uences the demand for or development of soft-
ware. The global technological level is driven by developments in hardware
technology, new applications, new features, consumer demands and so on.
The `real' technological level of any piece of software quickly deteriorates as
externally determined technological possibilities (processor capacity, applica-
tion demands, etc.) and consumer demands grow. Therefore the technology
embedded in a developed piece of software must be adjusted in accordance
with external (global) technological progress, i.e. innovation.
4.2 A simple framework
Consider a heterogeneous goods software duopoly. The two ¯rms a and b
service the imperfectly separated market segments A and B respectively.
Instead of competing on price or quantity, the two ¯rms compete in the tech-
nology of their respective software products. Hence the strategic variable is
the technological level of the product, or rather, innovation and development.
22As no single software product is at the technological frontier in terms of every one of
its technological dimensions, the technological level of any speci¯c piece of software must
always be lower than the global technological level.
24At time t the technological level of ¯rm i's software is denoted by ¿i
t ; i = a;b.
Further, the global technology level, Tt, represents hardware advances, new
applications or changes in consumer demand.
The demand for software { or rather, the dissemination of the two soft-
ware products { is assumed to be symmetric and to depend on the techno-
logical advance/ability of the software, and on the interdependence between
the two market segments, i.e. the two products are imperfect substitutes.
Dissemination, si
t, of the two products a and b at time t is represented by
si
t = maxf0;qi





























Parameter ¯ > 0 is a measure of the substitutability of the two products
and ® is a positive constant. The expressions
¿i
t
Tt represent the \real technol-
ogy level" of ¯rm i: namely, how advanced the technological capability of the
software product is in relation to the hardware ability, consumer demands etc.
Thus (1) and (2) state that the extent to which a certain software producer's
product is distributed/sold depends positively on its own real technology
level and negatively on the competitor's real technology level. Equations (1)
and (2) also include the e®ect of external technological development in Tt
which devalues the real technology level and dissemination of both software
products.23
Even though the model avoids the notion of price or quantity competi-
tion, the principles of maximisation are still applicable. Assume that ¯rms
derive some payo® from each distributed/sold unit of software. In particular
there is a gain ½, which could represent the reputational or signaling value
for an OSS producer or more conventionally the per unit monetary reward
for a proprietary software ¯rm. There is also a cost C, which is assumed to
depend proportionally on the technology level of the product. Thus, a high
real technology level is associated with high development and maintenance
costs, i.e. larger support or hotline costs, costs of bug-¯xing or indeed distri-
bution and production costs. The latter in particular can be seen as driven
by the fact that programmers working on a more advanced software prod-
uct are more expensive than those working on an inferior software project.
Postulating C = c
¿i
t
Tt the gain function for ¯rm i can be stated as:
23Or put di®erently, if both ¯rms opt for technological stand-still, global developments












; i = a;b: (3)
How does this situation of software duopoly compare to that of a software
monopolist? Assume that a monopolist is servicing both market segments A
and B with the respective software products a and b. The gain functions for
the monopolist are identical to those formulated in (3). Yet the monopolist
is aware of the interaction of the two markets, represented by ¯ in (1) and
(2), and takes this fact into account. In particular, due to symmetry, a
monopolist, M, realises that ¿Ma
t = ¿Mb
t . Rewriting the monopolists gain















; i = a;b: (4)
Since both markets behave identically, in subsequent analysis it su±ces
to consider only one of the market segments.
4.3 Innovation { setting technology levels
In the case of a software duopoly, where ¯rms behave noncooperatively and
simultaneously have to choose their respective technology levels to maximise













and similarly for ¯rm b.
Given that both ¯rms expect all future technology levels Tt+j ; (j =










Lemma 1. The technology level set by a software duopoly increases for a
higher payo®, ½, a falling cost, c, and a higher degree of substitutability, ¯.
Thus, if we assume that an OSS duopoly has lower costs c compared to
a for-pro¯t software duopoly, then Lemma 1 states that an OSS software
duopoly will produce a higher technological level. Similarly a duopoly with
a higher payo® ½, which may be the case for for-pro¯t ¯rms will settle for a
higher technology level. Finally, once the two software products become more
homogeneous (higher ¯) the strategic interaction in the software duopoly
triggers ¯rms to set a higher technology level.
26Compare this to the asymmetric case. In a software duopoly with het-




2cacb(®2+4®¯+3¯2) , such that
@¿a
t
@ca < 0 and
@¿a
t
@cb < 0. A low
cost competitor b increases the technology level set by ¯rm a. Thus, we
obtain:
Lemma 2. A reduction in the cost of one ¯rm in a software duopoly increases
the individual technology levels set by both ¯rms.
In terms of Microsoft versus OSS, Lemma 2 implies that the entry of
a low-cost competitor pushes up the technology level of the for-pro¯t ¯rm
beyond the level that would have resulted from a for-pro¯t entry with higher
costs, cb. Return now to the assumption that ca = cb = c, such that the
impact from OSS on the for-pro¯t competitor stems solely from the strategic
interaction of the two ¯rms rather than from the possible cost advantages
that an OSS competitor may have.
Compare the above ¯ndings to a software monopolist maximising (4), and
expecting all future technology level Tt+j ; j = (1;2;:::) to be equal to Tt.
Such monopolist has ¯rst order conditions for market segment A and B that









Lemma 3. The technology level set by a software monopolist increases for
higher payo®, ½, and a falling cost, c, but is independent of the degree of
substitutability, ¯.
Thus, given that an OSS developer can be fairly assumed to have a lower
cost c, an OSS monopolist will provide a higher technology level than a for-
pro¯t monopolist. Yet, if the for-pro¯t monopolist has a the higher payo® ½
compared to the payo® for the OSS developer, than the reverse conclusion
applies.
Comparing (6) to (7) leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Given a global technology level Tt, each ¯rm i = a;b in a
software duopoly sets a technology level ¿i
t for its respective software product
that exceeds the technology level set by a software monopolist, ¿Mi
t .
Proposition 1 states that a monopolist will choose a lower technology level
than a software duopoly. The monopolist, in contrast to the duopoly, takes
into account the externality that a high technology level in one software
segment has on the dissemination of other software products in his port-
folio. Proposition 1 carries an important message concerning claims that
27competition can be harmful in technology and research-intensive industries.
If ¯rms do indeed compete in technology, then competition { moving from a
monopoly situation to a duopoly situation { triggers innovation activity and
arrives at a higher technological level. This bene¯cial impact of entry occurs
no matter if the entry takes place in a commercial software market or in an
existing OSS market, i.e. the case of forking of an OSS project.
Proposition 1 contains the intuitively compelling insight that, in a
duopoly setting, not only do ¯rms innovate their product in order to op-
timise their technology position with respect to the outside technological
development, they also innovate in anticipation of the other ¯rm's innova-
tion activity. This e®ect matters more the closer substitutes the goods are,
i.e. the closer competitors the two ¯rms are.
Finally, from the above results we would expect to observe a higher fre-
quency of technological adjustments (new releases) for OSS markets and for
software markets that experience entry or forking. Thus such markets will be
tracking the technological development more closely, i.e. adjusting to smaller
shocks, while the monopolist stands still longer, etc. The model further sug-
gests that in mixed markets where one competitor is a commercial software
enterprise and the other is an OSS developer, the chosen technological level
and the rate of innovation are higher than in a pure commercial software
duopoly, but lower than in a pure OSS duopoly. Thus, within the present
framework, evaluated in terms of the technology level and progress, the pure
OSS duopoly dominates all other market structures treated in the paper.
Furthermore, assuming comprehensively that a higher technological level
and a faster adjustment to global technological developments are associated
with higher user utility, and given that increasing the number of software
¯rms meets no supply constraint in terms of programmer capacity, then our
model implies that users bene¯t from entry of an OSS developer into a soft-
ware market dominated by a monopolist. This holds for both cases: whether
the monopolist is a commercial software enterprise or an OSS developer, as
well as for the case of forking and branching in OSS projects.
5 Conclusion
The paper analyses the in°uence of entry and competition by open source
software (OSS) on innovation and technological progress in software markets.
The best-known example of such an event is the entry of Linux into the op-
erating system market. Some observers fear that the progress in software
technology, that is the rate of innovation, will slow or even stop altogether as
a consequence of OSS entry into former highly concentrated (monopolistic)
28markets. Possible channels for such anti-innovative impact are the reduced
pro¯tability and thus resulting lower R&D expenditures in the industry or
an allegedly lower e±ciency of the OSS innovation process. The paper re-
views the OSS innovation process and highlights the pro- and anti-innovative
features of this development model. The most important pro-innovative fea-
tures of OSS development are based on the huge number of programmers
involved, and the high knowledge di®usion and motivation among program-
mers. Anti- innovative OSS features, on the other hand, are the potentially
high development redundance and the problems associated with an undi-
rected innovation process as well as the occurrence of forks and branches in
OSS projects. Next, the paper presents empirical evidence on innovation in
the software business post OSS. The data collected does not reveal an anti-
innovative e®ect. On the contrary, it suggests that, if anything, increasing
competition in the software industry promotes innovation.
Based on these observations, we set up a simple model of software compe-
tition where producers compete in technology rather than price or quantity.
Within the model, the development decision of the ¯rms regarding how to
set the technology level of their software (innovate) is examined. We ¯nd
that the move from monopoly to duopoly always increases the technology
level and thus the level of innovation chosen by the enterprises. Thus, OSS
entry has a positive impact on ¯rms' willingness to innovate and heightens
the overall technological level in the industry. Furthermore, under the as-
sumption that the development and innovation costs of OSS ¯rms are lower
than those of commercial ¯rms, the model implies that a pure OSS duopoly
dominates in terms of technology levels and rate of innovation monopolies
(either commercial or OSS), pure commercial duopolies and mixed duopolies
(e.g. one OSS ¯rm and one for-pro¯t ¯rm). Put di®erently, competition is
still good, also when the product is knowledge-intensive, that is software.
To sum up the speci¯c features of the OSS innovation process identi¯ed in
this paper, much of the empirical data available to date and our theoretical
considerations on the e®ects of competition in a technology setting software
duopoly all suggest a pro-innovative e®ect of the emergence of OSS.
Finally, the ¯ndings of the present paper give rise to a wide range of
new and fundamental questions for understanding the software business post
OSS. From all we know about OSS and its successful entry into the software
industry, one would judge that it has come to stay. OSS is able to challenge
and potentially replace incumbent commercial ¯rms. One key towards under-
standing this success is { in our view { the impressive innovative performance
of the OSS development model. However, only if paired with simple and ac-
cessible distribution concepts and high levels of user-friendliness that are
acceptable for a wide range of users other than specialized user programmers
29can this potential be unrevealed. Furthermore, the OSS development model
might well extend to other business applications, and it has certainly always
featured as a model of innovation in academia, where often the ¯ndings and
methods of individual researchers and groups of researchers are made openly
accessible through publication in journals and presentation at conferences.
In fact, these principles have been the backbone of scienti¯c progress for cen-
turies. Viewed as an extension of these fundamental principles of scienti¯c
research, OSS might not be such a new phenomenon after all, and rather the
brief heyday of closed source software in in the 1980s and 90s would have
been an exception.
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